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lN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ORDERVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation; MT. CAR11EL IRRIGATION COMPANY, a
corporation; HENRY CARROLL,
W~RRILL MACDONALD, HOWAHD SPENCER, LYLE CHAMJ3EHLAIN, M. G. HOLGATE,
DUKE AIKEN, GRANT HEATON, FRED MAJOR and DUNCAN
MACDONALD,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.-

'
\

Case No.
10325

GLENDALE IRRIGATION COMPANY and vV AYNE D. CRIDDLE,
Utah State Engineer,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Thi:,.; is an action to determine whether or not Glendale Irrigation Company is entitled to a priority higher
titan all the other proprietors on the East Fork of the
Yirgin River (Long Valley Creek) entitling it to all
thP waters of that source until its rights are filled.
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DISPOSFrION IN THE LOWER COURT
On Motion for Summary Judgment by both Plaintiffs and Defendants the District Court of Kane County
granted the motion of Plaintiffs opposing and denied
the motion of Defendants asserting the priority just described.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs and Respondents seek affirmance of the
trial court's ruling.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because of significant omissions the Respondents do
not agree with the Statement of Facts of Appellants.
The Plaintiffs and Respondents will be referred to
as the Plaintiffs and the Defendants and Appellants as
the Defendants.
Exhibited \vith this brief is an appendix which contains first an illustrative map of the entire Virgin River
System and thereafter abstracts from the "McCarty,"
"Burton" and "Cox'' Decree proceedings which are the
prior judicial determinations affecting the rights of these
parties. As a footnote on each document there is indicated its source among the five files of the Burton-Cox
Litigation which were made a part of the record here
as Exhibits 2 through 6. So that continued resort to
those cumbersome files will not be required, we will
ref er to those excerpts by appendix page. The original
document may be found by ref erring to the appendix
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page footnote disclosing the file and page ·where it is
entered.
'l'he Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was
bas<'d upon the entire record in the prior general adjudictions and the files in this action including specifically the
Original and Supplemental Interrogatories and the an~\\ (•rs thereto (Tr. 45-60) and the depositions taken of
all holders of the office of President of Glendale Irrigation Company' for the period between 1918 and the
[ll'Psent (Depositions appear at Tr. 78-138). 2
The Defendants did not oppose any of these showings with affidavits or other countering representations
as permitted by Rule 56 ( c).
GEOGRAPHY
Long Valley Creek is an upper, isolated and the
1•asternmost section of the Virgin River (Appendix i)
commonly referred to as the latter's "East Fork." It
arises in northern Kane County and flows through the
rnlley in which are situated the towns of Glendale,
Orderville, and Mt. Carmel and on the floor of which
ar(• farms irrigated by ranchers and agricultural proprietors who, as holders of individually decreed rights or
as combined into one or more of the corporate water
distrihution systems holding decreed interests in the
East Fork, comprise the parties to this action.
'Tr. 87, 97, and 128 establish identities and tenure of the company's
Presidents during that period.
2
Except for that of Joseph Smith, President for one year (in 1944),
now deceased.
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At the south end of Long Vall0y the creek contours
southwesterly where it flmvs through deep-gulched country in the course of which its waters are not capal1le
of being used for some 20 miles and until it reaches the
''Dixie Country'' in -Washington County. It is only in
winter months that any water reaches -·Washington
County. (Appendix Page vi).
PRIOR ADJUDICATIONS
In 1900 a decree determining rights to the use of
East Fork waters was entered and known thereafter
as the ''McCarty Decree" (Admitted by the pleadings,
Tr. 36-39, and set out in full at Appendix Pages iv and v).
Contrary to the conclusion drawn by Appellants (Appellants' Brief Page 3), this Decree was continually regarded by the parties, including Defendant Glendale
Irrigation Company, as conclusive of the respective
priorities of all users on the stream. All parties acknmYledged their priorities to be upon a par or equal. (Appendix Pages ii and iii).
In 1919 the case of St. George & Washington Canal
Conipany vs. Hurricane Canal Company, Case No. 270,
in the Fifth Judicial Court of Utah, County of Washington, was instituted later to become a general adjudication,
one of the first after enactment of the authorizing statute
(Chapter 67, Laws of 1919, now 73-±-1, et. seq., FCA,
1953), and ultimately to embrace the entire Virgin River
including the East Fork (Exhibit 2).
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Presiding over this Court •ms Judge Thomas H.
Bnrton and the adjudication he made is commonly known
a:; the "Burton Decree."
When this action ('scalated into a general adjudication, watn mwrs' claims werP filed by all of the East Fork
n:;ers. \Ve agree with counsel that Orderville Irrigation
Company claimed a priority of 1871 and l\It. Carmel Irrigation Company a priority date of 1870 but that GlendalP stood npon the year 1865'
'Although we contend the history of colonization in Long Valley
will not be material because of the McCarty Decree, a claim has
been made that the Town of Glendale was settled first. The
historical facts are that no colonization was made in Glendale
prior to the remainder of "Long Valley" but only an entry attempted by the Berry Brothers in 1865, some of the family of whom
were killed by Indians, causing the entire expedition to withdraw.
Neither they nor any one else returned to Glendale until the entire
Valley was settled during the period of 1871 to 1874 from which
time they maintained continuous colonization. In the monograph
series publication of Utah State University Press, January 1964,
Forms and Methods of Early Mormon Settlement in Utah and the
Surrounding Region, 1847 to 1877, by Joel Edward Ricks, Emeritus
Professor of History, we find the following statement at page 107:
The advice of Brigham Young was followed, a meeting was
held and a resolution to abandon Muddy settlement was passed
by a vote of 61 to 2. A committee was sent to investigate the
possibilities of Long Valley in South Central Utah. The historian of the United Order of Orderville described their findings as follows:
'The explorers entered the Valley on Christmas Day 1870
and found it to be simply a canyon from 100 yards to %
of a mile in width and about 15 miles in length from the
lower part and going up the river to the upper tributary
or forks of the river (Virgin). The valley contains about
1300 acres of tillable land and scarcely enough water in the
river to irrigate it. From the lower part of the valley to
what is known as the rim of the basin, is about Twenty
Five miles. The small valley has several canyons branching
out reaching the rim. Within six miles of the top of the
rim and on the top are covered with long leaved pine
timber, from which a good quality of lumber can be made.
The soil of the valley is generally heavy clay, the climate
is mild and adapted to the raising of fruits and small grain.'
The report of the explorers was favorably received by the
people in the towns on the banks of the Muddy so they left
their houses and farms and migrated in a body 200 strong
entering Long Valley in March 1874 and in the southern end
they founded Mt. Carmel.

5

The East Fork users were apprehensive that tlw
Washington County Plaintiffs might assert very early
priority dates and place a call upon the waters from
upper sources and being fearful that their rights may
thus be taken away, the principal Long Valley users
joined to send representatives to St. George to "fight
for and uphold the 'McCarty Decree' " (Tr. 83, 115-117). :
This same fear undoubtedly prompted Glendale and
others to exaggerate their priority dates in completing
water users' claims. It is inconceivable that one hundred
per cent of the uses under Glendale's diversions could
all have been perfected before any of the other corporate
or individual users made any diversions.
Threats posed by the general adjudication to the
East Fork rights were removed by a stipulation of the
Washington County users disclaiming interest in the
East Fork irrigation practices (Appendix Page vi). Also
removed as a result of that concession was the necessity
of proving accuracy of the priority dates claimed which,
as indicated in the prior footnote, could never have been
established.
Pursuant to the general adjudication statute the
State Engineer filed his proposed determination on September 10, 1924 (Exhibit 5, Page 14) suggesting that
the Court establish disparate priorities as between the
users on the East Fork.
On December 15, 1924 and within the 90 days allowed
for doing so, Glendale Irrigation Company, Orderville
Irrigation Company, Mt. Carmel Irrigation Company,
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and the individual ranchers joined in an objection to
the proposed determination unequivocally rejecting the
attempt by the State Engineer to fix different dates of
priority or to rank those rights established by the McCarty Decree with uneven priorities. To this objection
the parties attached a copy of the "McCarty Decree.''
The deposition of Marcellus Johnson establishes execution of the document by Glendale Irrigation Company
(Tr. 8+, 85, 138). This Objection is set out in full on
Pages ii and iii of the Appendix and the original with
its exhibits and executed counterparts can be found m
Exhibit 5, the Burton Decree file marked "1924," at
pages 133 to 137, inclusive.
The prayer of this pleading (styled "Objection")
was granted by implication by an Order of the Court
dated October 9, 1925 (Appendix Page vii), was assumed by the State Engineer to have been previously granted
as appears from his petition dated October 21, 1926 (Appendix Page viii) and is included within the class of stipulations or other resolutions of objections, all of which
are approved for incorporation and carrying into the
final determination, by an order dated October 27, 1926,
signed by Judge Burton (Appendix Page ix). In each
of those three documents the general adjudication proceedings moved forward upon the recited premise that:
* * * All parties objecting to the State Engineer's
Proposed Determination having either appeared
personally in court or by stipulation filed herein,
and all parties consented that the Court render
its decree in accordance with the proposed determination of the State Engineer filed herein as
amended and corrected by said stipulations, with

7

the c'xception of that of [an objection not affPcting this issue].
The ''Burton Decree" entered m 1925 carried the
recital that:

* ~, * within said time several of the parties filed
objections to specific parts of said Propos<c'd Determination * * * and on the 12th day of December,
1925 the said parties by their attorneys or in person had entered into written stipulations, or oral
stipulations, made in open court, from time to
time, and agreeing to all their rights of, in, or
to said water, and the use of the waters of the
Virgin River System, with the exception of the
Virgin Canal Company * * * which objections
were presented to the Court * * * and the Court
rendered judgment on said protest, and it appearing that the Proposed Determination made by
the State Engineer had been corrected to conform
\vith the judgment above mentioned.
* * * *

The Schedule of Rights, determining the priority,
quantity, purposes, etc., under which said water
is hereby decreed to the parties named herein
is the amended Proposed Determin,ation of the
State Engineer, as designated in Sec. I hereof and
made a part of this decree, which is as follows:
[The schedule of water rights enumerates
and specifies the rights of the parties]
(Emphasis added)
We have religiously searched all the exhibits reflecting the Burton-Cox Decree proceedings, and cannot find
that a "Burton" Decree was ever filed. Apparently
the State Engineer prepared one and obtained certificates of true copies thereof, (Tr. 169); however, the
8

files do not disclose that a "Burton" Decree was ever
entered.

'rlie "certified copy" of the Burton Decree which
is on file in the Office of, and will be supplied to the
Court by, the State Engineer, shows that the same volnmes of water were awarded to the parties as had been
f(iven them under the McCarty Decree (Appendixpagex).

rSES ON THE STREAM DURING AND
AFTER THE GENERAL ADJUDICATION
'l'hat the parties believed their "Objection" had been
am•pted and the relief prayed for granted is an incontrovertihle inference from the manner in which they
conducted themselves during and following the BurtonCox Litigation. This contemporaneous construction by
the parties is elucidated by the discovery proceedings
upon which the Motion for Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment '''as based.
At the conclusion of a hearing in this action on the
first concurrent :Motions for respective Summary J udgments sought by both sides, the Court reserved judgment
<lnd desired evidence of uses on the stream from the
time the Burton and Cox Decrees were entered and until
the time the instant action was commenced.
Interrogatories were asked of the Defendants separately and, upon receiving responses to the first, Supplemental Interrogatories were submitted. (Tr. 45-60).
9

Glendale Irrigation Company conceded that only
in the years 1956 and 1961 did it ever claim, and only
in the year 1961 did it attempt to exercise, its right
to an 1865 priority date. Negative reference to assertions of that preference were made by answers to the
effect that Glendale Irrigation Company had never
"waived" or "agreed to waive" its priority (Tr. 50).
However, when asked specifically:
(Tr. 55 and 56) Calling your attention to Interrogatory No. 5 of the previous interrogatories
and the answer thereto submitted on October 21,
1963, said answer states in part:
'* * * it is the contention of this Defendant that so far as known to it, Defendant
has been given its proper amount of water
under its proper priority.'
With respect to the phrase, ''so far as known to
it," please recite the extent of any such knowledge, the years in which it is claimed by tlw
Defendant Glendale Irrigation Company that it
has been given the proper amount of water under
the claimed 1865 priority. * * * If [this information] is not personal knowledge of one of its witnesses, but is only upon information and belief,
please state specifically the facts upon which that
1nformation and belief is based.
The Defendant Glendale Irrigation Company answered:
"(Tr.58) This interrogatory is not subject to
any precise answer, and particularly at this time."
'The Defendant stated that it has no record of prior
distributions or uses (Tr. 51).
The Defendant replied to interrogatories reaching
that question that its witnesses would be Walter W.
10

Cannon, \Villard Mackelprang, Charles Anderson, Rex
Bauer, and "any witnesses in court brought there by
the State Engineer's Office." (Tr. 57). The State Eng·ineer answered that it had no witnesses pertaining to
uses on the stream except for the year 1963 and after
this action was commenced (Tr. 59). Walter W. Cannon
was a Deputy State Engineer residing at St. George at
the time of the Burton Decree (Tr. 117) and not affiliated
with the Defendant Glendale Irrigation Company. Therefore, the deposition of the other three witnesses of Defendants together with that of Marcellus Johnson, longtime President of Glendale Irrigation Company and its
President and stipulator in the Burton Decree proceedings, were taken and appear at Pages 78 through 138 of
the transcript.
Marcellus .T ohnson was 83 years old at the time of
his deposition (Tr. 80). He had irrigated from the East
F'ork since shortly after 1900 and was on the Glendale
Irrigation Company's Board of Directors from 1917 until
19GO except for "three or four years." He was President
for 30 of those years and specifically during the Burton
guneral adjudication (Tr. 80-82, 84).
l\Ir. Johnson's deposition establishes that the intention of Glendale Irrigation in the Burton Litigation
\lai:l only to protect its interests under the McCarty Decree, to retain the same priorities and not to acquire
any new or higher right; that Glendale Irrigation neither
attempted nor instructed its representatives or attorneys
to attempt attaining a higher priority than that of the
other users and never received any water based upon
11

any preferential priority. His testimony beginning at
Page 83 of the transcript is as follows:
(Line 21)
Q.

A.

* ~, * Now at the time you sent your representative down to the Court which was supervising this new Decree, did you give your
representative any instructions about the priorities that you wanted in the Decree?
No.

(Tr. P. 86, Line 8)
At any time since the Burton Decree was entered has Glendale Irrigation Company to
your knowledge been given a priority on all
the water of the East F'ork so as to fill their
rights to 100% before anyone else got any
water?
A. Not according to my knowledge.

Q.

Q.

A.

Now during this same period of time, Mr.
Johnson, if there was insufficient water in
the East .B'ork to come up to the primary
rights, would you pro rate losses?
Yes.

All the users would pro rate losses; is that
correct?
A. Yes.

Q.

Now during these periods about which you
were speaking, were there ever years when
there was not enough water in the East Fork
to fill all of the rights?
A. Yes.

Q.

Q.
A.

How often would that occur?
Well, that was quite a common thing in July,
before the rains come. I would say after the
run-off in the spring why it would drop down.
12

I can't say just what month. I wouldn't try
to say because sometimes it held up better
than it would at other times.
Q.
A.

You say it was a common thing though?
It ·was a common thing. I don't think we
ever had 100% all summer as long as I was
in the Glendale Irrigation Company. I don't
remember it.

Q.

·while you were President of Glendale Irrigation Company -vvas there ever any demand
made on the State Engineer or his deputy,
the River Commissioner, or anyone else, to
give Glendale one hundred per cent of its
right before any of the other rights were
filled~

A.

During the time I had it and was President?

During the time you have been acquainted
with distribution of water on the East Fork
has that ever happened, when you were President or at other times?
A. In the last two or three years has there been
Q.

any~

Q.
A.

Prior to that time?
No, not prior to that time.

Q.

Not prior to that time to your knowledge?

A.

No.

At Page 8S of the Transcript, under cross-examination by Mr. Cline, J\,J r. Johnson testified:

Q.

\Vell, what I want to know is when was the
first time, if yon can recall, that there was
any mwstion ever raised by the Glendale peopl~ c'oncerning a prior right to that of the
Orderville people 1
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A.

That would have been 19GO when we were
at that meeting in James Esplin home when
you reported having visited the State Engineer, Mr. Bauer.

MR. BAUER: I think that was at your home.
I think it was at your home when he asked
permission to go to the State Engineer's office to find out what our rights were. I think
it was in your home, but I could be wrong,
Mr. Johnson. That is when the first question
came up.
Q.
A.

Q.

Now, Mr. Johnson, you filed these objections
that you referred to a moment or two ago
along with the other people~
Yes, sir.
Now included in those objections are the fact
that you were objecting to the various dates
of priorities rather than following the McCarty Decree~ That's correct, isn't it 1
Wasn't that one of your grounds for objections, that the Burton Decree, the proposed
determination set these various users up on
various dates of priorities rather than following the McCarty Decree~ You recall
whether that was one of the grounds of your
objections~

A.

I wouldn't say that, no.

You don't know whether that was one of the
grounds for objections~
A. No I don't. To be honest, I had full faith
in the McCarty Decree when Mr. Anderson
went down to that hearing in Dixie, that he
was asking for the McCarty Decree, and that
they gave us our rights and because of the
checking up that was taking place, the qurstion of rights and all of that caused, I guess,
some question in our minds and when .Mr.

Q.

14

Anderson came back he said - he reported
to the Board, as near as I can remember,
that the McCarty Decree would not be molested, that they were not concerned with the
water up the Greek, all they were concerned
with in that hearing was the water in the
Dixie Area.
'l'he deposition of Rex Bauer, another former President of Glendale Irrigation Company, established that
the testimony of .Mr. Johnson was accurate regarding
non-exercise of the priority asserted in this litigation
(Tr. 97) although he did say one president knew of its
inclusion in the decree in 1944 (Tr. 98; cf. 128). The
right \Vas never "enjoyed" until the "last two or three
years." (Tr. 97)
He further established the assertion of the right
claimed in Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories to
have taken place in 1956 was actually 1958, 1959, or 1960
and was not by the company but was by him personally.
!Tr. 99) He said that he did not ask the State Engineer
to ''change anything" (Tr. 101) except the manner of
administration in checking the diversions, and that the
existence of a decreed priority came as a "surprise to a
lot" (T1·. 102, line 13-15).
His testimony regarding usage found on Page 103
of the Transcript is as follows:
Q.

Let me ask you this : You surely know the
answer to this, are there any times when
Glendale was getting all the water and someone else was getting none?
A. No, sir, I don't know of a time that that was
the case.

15

\Vere there any times when Glendale was getting one hundred per cent of its water and
anyone else was getting less than one hundred
per cent?
A. Like I said, I have never been a water commissioner or water master, so I don't know.

Q.

As far as you know, the first time this Complaint ever arose was when the State Engineer sent his deputy down and imposed these
priorities so as to give Glendale one hundred
per cent of its rights before anyone received
anything that they were decreed?
A. Well, I presume that that was the first time
it was done. But that isn't the first time it
was brought up. Like I said, Brother Smith
always insisted that that was the case.

Q.

Q.

A.

But you said that Glendale never did enjoy
the right that he claimed Glendale had?
No, I didn't know of it ever enjoying it.

At Page 109 of the Transcript .Mr. Bauer concedes
that 1961 was the first year in ·which Glendale Irrigation Company benefited by any higher priority than the
other users.
The deposition of Charles Anderson, formerly a
president of Glendale Irrigation Company and one of
the representatives of Glendale Irrigation Company and
the other users at the time of the Burton general adjudication, testified as follows (Tr. 118):
Q.
A.

Now after the Burton Decree was entered
'
did Glendale's
rights change in any way 1
No only that in the Burton Decree the pri' dates were mentioned and they weren 't
ority
in the McCarty Decree.
16

Q.

All right. As a result of that did Glendale
start getting more \Yater?
A. No, they didn't, the company kind of \Vent
on a share and share alike basis, as Brother
Johnson, Marcellus, told you, for a while.
Q.
A.

How long did that last?
Oh, it lasted up until the time the Glendale
Irrigation ·Company asked the State Engineer to grant them whatever rights they had.

Q.

And that would have been in 1960 or 1961, is
that right?
Whenever that was.

A.

Now during this period of time between 192.J.
and 1960 or 1961, were there years when there
wasn't enough water in East Fork of the Virgin River to satisfy all the rights?
A. Well, I imagine there was. I can't remember
the years when there wasn't some years it
was drier than it was other years.
Q.

About what months in those years would this
condition exist?
A. Oh, I think along the middle of summer before the summer rains got started, is usually
the low time.
Q.

Q.
A.

Would it happen in almost every year?
vVell, in some years it didn't. When you have
a heavy snow fall and the water was high,
why some years you had all the water you
wanted, but -

Q.

vV ould those years be the exception or would
they be the rule?
Oh, I think it was an exception.

A.
Q.

A.

The exceptional years would be the ones when
the primary was full?
Yes.
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All right, now during that period of time
would you say that all companies continued
on this share and share alike basis up until
1960 or 1961?
A. Yes, I think they tried to do that.
Q.

The only other witness Defendants proposed to call
was Willard Mackelprang who testified in his deposition (Tr. 127, 128) that although some of the Glendale
Irrigation Company users in the mid-fifties claimed they
should be getting more water under a higher priority
nothing was done about it and the uses on the stream
did not change. He made an unofficial visit to the State
Engineer's Office in 1956, but no action was taken to
change the administration of the stream (Tr. 130). No
actual change in distribution based on Glendale's priority
took place until 1961. (Tr. 135)
This suit was commenced immediately after that
action was ordered by the State Engineer (Tr. 1).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR A SUMMARY .JUDGMENT UPON THE ISSUE
OF PRIORITIES SOLELY.
A.

The Burton and Cox Decrees must be interpreted to continue equal priority dates as between
parties to the McCarty Decree.

B.

The historical and present uses on the stream,
the contemporaneous construction of the Bur-
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ton and Cox Decrees by the parties, and the
stipulation resolving the issue of priorities
collectively or in the disjunctive preclude Defendants from changing the uses, practices
or administration of the East Fork.
C.

To the extent that either the Burton or the
Cox Decree, or both, purports to subordinate
Plaintiffs' priorities to those of the Defendant
Glendale Irrigation Company, the adjudication
is void.

POINT II.
THE COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN REFUSING
TO DISQUALIFY IDMSELF.
A.

The Affidavit of Defendants was insufficient
as a matter of law.

B.

The Affidavit of Defendants was not timely.

C.

Defendants cannot be prejudiced because of
the availability of complete direct review of
both the facts and the law.

POINT III.
THE INTERROGATORIES AND THEIR ANSWERS,
THE DEPOSITIONS, AND THE ENTIRE FILE AND
PLEADINGS ARE SUFFICIENT UPON WHICH TO
BASE THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIRECTED THE
STATE~ ENGINEER TO DISREGARD PRIORITY
DA'I'I~S PURPORTEDLY ADOPTED BY THE BURTON-COX DECREES IN DEROGATION OF THE
EQUAL PRIORITY DATES ESTABLISHED BY
'l'HE MC CARTY DECREE.
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ARGUl\IENT
POINT I.
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A SUMMARY .JUDGMENT AND IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIO~
FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT UPON THE ISSUE
OF PRIORITIES SOLELY.
A.

The Burton and Cox Decrees must be interpreted to continue equal priority dates as between
parties to the McCarty Decree.

Actions determining water rights are intrinsically
equitable. Jens en vs. Birch Creek Ranch Co., 76 Utah
356, 289 P. 1097.
It has been frequently stated that equity regards as
done that which ought to be done. This has been said
to be equity's favorite maxim. It is closely connected
with the maxim that e<1uity regards intent and suhstance rather than form, and the foundation of all distinctively equitable property rights, estates, and interests. 30 C.J.S. Page 507. Equity, Sec. 106; Page 513,
Sec. 107.

In applying the rule that equity regards intent and
substance rather than form, the case of Trapp v. Gordon,
7 N.E.2d 869, 366 Ill. 102, declares that subsequent acts
and conduct of the parties with reference to a written
instrument will be considered in determining the intention of the parties which intention is the real sourte
in determining the proper meaning of the transaction.
On the question of interpretation of stipulated or
consent judgments, in 49 C.J.S. at Page 314, Sec. 178,
it is declared :
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[A consent judgment's operation and effect]
must be gathered from the terms used in the
agreement, and it should not be extended beyond
the clear import of such terms * * *
The indisputable record demonstrates
cisely fitting all these maxims:

facts

pre-

The stipulation of the parties (Appendix ii, iii)
spPaks for itself. All the interested parties desired equivalPnt priorities. What ought to have been done was the
immediate modification of the State Engineer's Proposed
Determination to establish 1870 priorities uniformly
among the stipulators.
The parties thereafter and continuously to the year
this action was commenced, conducted themselves as
though what ought to have been done actually had been
dorn'.
Upon these two propositions there is no evidence
more succinct than the testimony of the witness most
adverse (Tr. 51) to Plaintiffs' position, Charles Anderson, where he stated that he was the representative for
Glendale Irrigation Company at the general adjudication
]ll'oceedings at St. George in 1924 (Tr. 114); that there
\\ ne no court appearances other than for the purpose
of npholding the McCarty Decree (Tr. 115); no adverse
proceedings between the East Fork users (Tr. 116); and
that there ~were at that time and since have been no
('hanges in distribution practices on the East Fork (Tr.
118, 119).
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Sections 3± and 30, p. 117 of the Lmvs of 1919, enacting the general adjudication statute, and in force at
the time of the Burton-Cox proceedings provided in part:
If any contest or objection on the part of any
claimant shall have been filed, as in this chapter
provided, the court shall give not less than fifteen
days' notice to all claimants, stating when and
where the matter will be heard.

* * * *

The statements filed by the claimants shall stand
in the place of pleadings, and issues may be made
thereon * * * the filed statements of claimants
shall be competent evidence of the facts stated
therein wnless the same are put in issite.
(Emphasis added)
The water users' claims to the extent they purported
to rank priorities were not only put in issue by the
parties, they were expressly repudiated (Appendix ii and
iii) and the matter thereby conclusively resolved.
The record discloses no notice whatsover to the
claimants of a hearing upon any issues drmvn for the
plain reason that there were no longer any issues.
We are here dealing with a stipulated or "consent"
decree. That these parties' appearance and consent,
along with the others, formed the basis for the court's
jurisdiction to proceed is made clear by the documents
appearing at Appendix pages vii, viii, and ix.
'Concerning consent judgments, Volume 49 C.J.S. P·
312, Judgments Sec. 176, has this to say:
-While an order for entry of a consent judgment
is a judicial act in the sense that it requires the
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court to examine the record to determine its authority, the court also acts ministerially in the
sense that its power to enter judgment depends
on the agreement or consent of the parties. So,
where the parties have lawfully agreed, the actual
entry of judgment is a mere ministerial act.
While we agree with counsel that a judicial error
must be revised on appeal, nevertheless, a clerical error
may be cured any time; whether before or after time for
appeal has elapsed. One test used to determine whether
an error in a judgment is a judicial one or a clerical one
is whether the mistake relates to something the court
did not consider and pass on, or considered and erroneously decided, or whether there was a failure to preserve or correctly represent in the record, in all respects,
the actual decision of the court. 30A Am. J ur. 589,
Judgments Sec. 606.
The Burton and Cox Decree proceedings are a monument to judicial maladministration. There are overlapping files (one file, Exhibit 2, purports to cover from
1919 to 1935; another, Exhibit 5, claims to cover the
year 1924:; a third, Exhibit 3, claims to cover 1930 to
193± while a fourth, Exhibit 6, is marked "1930 to 1932"
and the last one (Exhibit 4) artlessly states it holds
"papers with no filing date shown.") There is no continuity either within or among the various files. There are
~everal versions of the "Cox" Decree appearing in the
files (See Exhibit 2 last documents, Exhibit 4, Page 59,
and Exhibit 6 Pages 1 to 17), all different. There cannot be found anywhere even one version of what is acCt>pted by repute as the "Burton" Decree.
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To say, m; Glendale's witnPss Anderson state;-;, that
the East Fork users were shunnPd (Tr. llG) is a gro 88
understatement.
\\Thile the Appellants lay great store in Plaintiffs'
omission to get the "error" of misapplied priority dates
corrected within the five y(•ar period of retained jurisdiction, they cannot point to anything in the file whif'lt
shows Plaintiffs knew or had any obligation to know
there ever occurred such an error or omission.
Section 37 Ch. 67 Laws of 1919 provided that
within 30 days after entry of a judgment:

* * * it shall be the duty of the clerk of thl'
district court to issue to each person awarded the
use of water by such judgment a certificate in
triplicate attested under the seal of the court,
setting forth the determination of his water right
as specified, in Section 33 [which required a complete definition of the right, including prioritie~.
if any]. Three copies of said certficate shall be
transmitted in person or by registered mail, to
such party * * *
Not only is there an absence of proof of entry of
the judgment or decree of the Court in 1925 (or at any
time thereafter) 1 there is also absence of proof that this
statute was complied with.
The State Engineer carried the burden of moving
this adjudication along as appears by the entire files
and his Proposed Determination was the nucleus and sub1

Although we do not necessarily take the position that there was
none.
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of the proceeding, as well as the vehicle on which
it traveled. (See Appendix vii, viii, and ix, and the Burton and Cox Decrees). However, reference to this Proposed Determination in all the court's orders and documentation is uniformly qualified with the words "as
amended," "as corrected to conform to the stipulations"
or ''as amended by the order of the court."
stancE~

This portfolio of proposed rights carried around by
thP State Engineer became a "fact of independent legal
significance" which the court approved from time to
timP, assuming that the State Engineer was correcting,
updating, and servicing the same as the parties compromised, settled or stipulated to resolve their differences.
The Court thus delegated to the State Engineer
the ministerial responsibility to see that the stipulations
of the parties emerged with the final determinaton. An
act or omission to perform this delegated responsibility,
being ministerial and nonjudicial, may be corrected at
any time. The State Engineer's oversight being correctible now, the Burton and Cox Decrees must, under the
rules that equity regards as done that which should
have been done and respects substance rather than form,
lie interpreted to supply the oversight if serious prejudice
and irreparable injury is not to be imposed upon the
Plaintiffs.
Equity regards and treats that as done which in
good conscience ought to be done (Pomeroy Eq. Jur.
Src. 36-1) and a court of equity will ratify that which
was done without its authority, when upon application

25

it would have ordered it to be done, if there is no other
method of doing justice. Johnson vs. Long (Maryland

1938) 199 Atl. 459, 116 A.L.R. 617.
POIN'l1 I

THE COURT \VAS CORRECT IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT UPON THE ISSUE
OF PRIORITIES SOLELY.
A.

***

B.

The historical and present uses on the stream,
the contemporaneous construction of the Burton and Cox Decrees by the parties, and the
stipulation resolving the issue of priorities
collectively or in the disjunctive preclude Defendants from changing the uses, practices
or administration of the East Fork.

An interesting theory of the Defendants is that
the Plaintiffs should have been barred to assert their
claims by reason of the doctrine of "laches" lying in
Plaintiffs' omission to correct the Burton Decree within
the five-year period of the court's retention of jurisdiction.
First, as we have pointed out to the court before,
there was not only not brought home to the Plaintiffs
the existence of such an error in the Burton Decree,
there was no Burton Decree available in the file, let
alone served upon any of the claimants.
\Ve respectfully call attention to page 12 of thr
Appellants' brief in which they state:
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Based upon such water users' claims, and
after a consideration of objections and protests
and hearings thereon, and it must be assumed,
upon competent evidence, the Court on December
12, 1925, made and entered a decree (printed
decree entered by Thos. H. Burton, Judge, dated
Dec. 12, 1925, on file in office of State Engineer).
The parenthesized expression in that statement is
very curious and very necessary: there is no original
Burton Decree in the files.
However, Mr. Anderson as representative of Plaintiff Mt. Carmel and Defendant Glendale Irrigation Companies knew of the decree, and he knew of the priorities
(Tr. 118). Still he reported to the Glendale Board of
Directors that their rights under the McCarty Decree
"had been protected.n (Tr. 89)
Defendants now say that the delict of Plaintiffs in
not correcting an "error" that they were advised could
never have occurred prevents them from correcting the
error now, but allows Defendants to begin, 35 years later,
changing the practices on the stream to conform to this
''error."
Glendale continually asserts that the other users
were required, to avoid the penalty of "laches," to correct this error within the so-called five-year retention
of jurisdiction period. The complete answer to this
l'laim is the rhetorical question: Why?
Why should they (the Plaintiffs) have attempted to modify a consent decree which they
had every reason to believe had been entered
according to the terms of their consent?
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"\Vhy should they have attempted to modify a
decree under ·which the rights they historic~J]y
had enjoyed did not change?
·
"\Vhy should they have attempted to modify a
decree that could not have been found in the'
court files 11
Why should they have attempted to modify a
decree that gave them, with only imperceptibl~
differences by farmers' standards of measuring
water, the same quantities of water as they had
historically enjoyed?~
"\Vhy ·would they have attempted to modify a decrer
under which they were being distributed the same proportionate quantities of water as they had always received (See Appendix page x) and were being assessed
according to a classification disciplined after their stipulation (See Appendix ii and iii and the full document
abstracted at Appendix viii and ix) ·which assessment was
the only contact they had with the State Engineer in
administration of the stream.
The Plaintiffs had no duty and were chargeable with
no notice making it prudent for them to presume to
change a decree which was serving them just as the
l\IcCarty Decree had historically done.
1

2

This is one situation where even the industrious brief writer would
be tempted to employ as a fact reference the phrase of th": incor·
rigible indolent: "see the record"; however, the best runmng kacd
count of the Burton proceedings seems to be the file mar e
"1919-1935" which contains indices for each year. No referenc~
is made anywhere to a Burton Decree or any other documen
purporting to be a final determination except for the "Cox" Decree
which calls itself (in all three versions) the "Supplemental and
Final Decree."
See Appendix page x.
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The witness Anderson, after representing parties at
the Burton proceedings (Tr. 11±, 115 ), returned and reported to Marcellus Johnson that "the McCarty Decree
would not be molested" (Tr. 89). Had he reported anyfoing different to Glendale's Board we may rest assured
it would have been corrected: because (1) Glendale would
have attempted to utilize the higher priority and the
other users would have pressed for a change in the
Decree or (2) and the more likely, the honorable men
who were in control of Glendale Irrigation Company's
affairs at the time would have insisted that the Decree
he modified.
Instead, Glendale waited until the five years passed
away and control passed from the hands of these respected men who observed their word (and their signatures) and want to assert this right after sleeping on
it for 35 years. (See 30 C.J.S. 499; Equity Sec. 100).
Glendale received a consideration for the 1924 stipulation: they did not have to prove that the company
had fully appropriated all of its rights prior to 1870.
An irrigation company is only a composite of the rights
which are conveyed to it by its charter stockholders in
Pxchange for shares. These constituent rights are as
varied as are the individuals who onwed them and the
lands upon which they were first appropriated. Inrluded with the rights transferred to the corporation for
shares would necessarily have been some inferior to
many other rights, some which undoubtedly were subordinated to the entire Glendale system.
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The recently decided case of Walker heirs vs. Walker
(July 19, 1965 Case No. 10286) disposes of a situation
where, as here, each party claims the other guilty of
laches. Justice Crockett, writing for the unanimous
Court, said :
The answer to sueh a stalemate seems to be
that the burden of taking some affirmative action
should be upon him who accuses the other of delay; and unless he has taken such action, or in
some manner put the other party on notice that
action is required, he cannot take advantage of the
delay.

In the Walker case the defendant claimed that sinC'e
he took deeds to the property 40 years before commencement of the action, 1 failure of the plaintiffs to attack
his ownership barred them for sleeping on their rights.
This Court held with logic that considerations entitling
the plantiffs to assume that they had not been divestrd
of their rights 2 together with the fact that some members
of the family remained in the property 3 "make the refusal
of the trial court to apply laches against the plaintiffs
harmonize ·with reason."
We respectfully submit that the parallel elements
and ratio dccidendi of the vValker case make it controlling
here.
Completely analagous to the position of the Defendant here, Glen·
dale Irrigation Company, who claims to have taken "title" to the
priority by the Burton or Cox Decree, or both, 35 years ago.
2 Which Plaintiffs in this action also had the right to assume becausd
of the "Objection" (Appendix ii, iii) by which Glendale surrendere
any claim it had to a priority.
BCorresponding to the Plaintiffs in this action continuing during all
these years to enjoy the right of equal priority dates and the pro·
rating of losses without deprivation of any water by the State
Engineer or Glendale Irrigation Company.
1
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It is controlling for the reason that the Defendants
here have utterly and categorically based, as they can
only base, their entire case 2nd claim upon the defense
of ]aches. They have neither equity, fairness, historical
entitlem~nt, nor use or possession on their side. If they
cannot prevail because Plaintiffs should have done something Plaintiffs failed to do they cannot prevail at all.

POINT I
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A SUMMARY JUDGJ\TENT AND IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT UPON THE ISSUE
0.F' PRIORITIES SOLELY.
A.
B.
C.

***
***
To the extent that either the Burton or the
Cox Decree, or both, purports to subordinate
Plaintiffs' priorities to those of the Defendant
Glendale Irrigation Company, the adjudication
is void.

In Eden Irrigation vs. District Court of Weber
County, 61 Utah 103, 211 P. 957, the general adjudication
statute was attacked as an unconstitutional delegation
of authority to the State Engineer by authorizing him
to determine and adjudicate water rights that previously
had been adjudicated and fixed by a Court. In disposing
of that assertion this Court said:

A complete answer to this contention is found
in the act itself. The italicized portion of Section
32 expressly provides that where the rights to
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the use of water from a stream or body of watt•r
have been adjudicated 'said water sh~ll be di 8tributed in accordance with such decree until the
same be reversed, modified, vacated, or otlwnrise
legally set aside.'

***

No one is required to again litigate or deft>nd
rights which have been fixed by a decree of eomt,
so long as he merely uses ·water in accor<lame
with the terms of such decree and the qnantit)'
of ~'ater awarded him thereby.
The McCarty Decree has established all rights as
among the corporations or users ·who were brought within "Class 1" of the Burton and Cox Decrees. It was
the obligation of the District Court of 'N ashington
County to leave them alone until that Decree was "reversed, modified, vacated, or otherwise legally set aside."
It cannot be disputed that the Court had nothing
before it which could deprive the Plaintiffs in this action
of the valuable vested interest of equal priorities. Without the appearance of the parties by the stipulation
(Appendix ii, iii) it had nothing before it to confer
jmisdiction to adjudicate any rights. Action of a court
is void if it finds an essential jurisdictional fact witl10ut
any proof. 30A AM. Jur. 17+, Jitdgmcnts, Sec. 22. 'rhe
Court had pmver to incorporate the McCarty Decree into
the Burton-Cox determinations but had no authority,
without consent or proof, to invade the East Fork right:;
inter sc.
The Comt had authority by virtue of the East
Fork users' stipulation to emliody the Tights then'

32

agrePd upon into its Decree. The la'.v is well settled
that a court may not render a judgment which transcends
tlw limits of its authority and the excess exercise of its
jurisdiction is void if beyond the powers granted to
the Court even where it has jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter. United States vs. W alkcr, 109
r.s. 208, 27 L. Ed. 927, 3 S.Ct. 277.
POINT IL

THI<J COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN REFUSING
'1'0 DISQUALIFY HIMSELF.
A.

The Affidavit of Defendants was insufficient
as a matter of law.

B.

The Affidavit of Defendants was not timely.

C.

Defendants cannot be prejudiced because of
the availability of complete direct review of
both the facts and the law.

A. An affidavit under Rule 63(a) being unassailable
hy countering proof, must have met the requirements
of the rule strictly. The affidavit of Charles Anderson
did not establish either bias or prejudice. The Court
had held two hearings, including a lengthy argument
on concurrent .l\fotions for Summary Judgment, had
received briefs, and reviewed all the exhibits.
There is no record of this fact, but counsel will not
deny that the Court, at the conclusion of the hearing
on the last motions, asked to meet with the parties,
and this was approved by all counsel. He may have said
he believed the Plaintiffs should prevail, but this is not
kno\rn. He could have said so upon the record, and that
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certainly should not have disqualified him after the
case, so far as counsel were concerned, had been fully
submitted; both believing there was no issue of law
or fact undetermined. Even had he expressed an opinioll
it would not have established bias or prejudice under
any state of the record ( 48 C.J.S. p. 1076 Judges, Sec.
89, See note '79) and certainly not at that point.
'l'he term "sympathy" as pointed out by Judge C.
Nelson Day who heard the affidavit on its sufficiency,
does not imply a correlative bias or prejudice.
Attempts to have the parties settle does not diRqualify a judge. 48 C.J.S. p. 1078, Judges, Sec. 89.

POINT II.
COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN REFUSING
TO DISQUALIFY HIMSELF.

THI~

1

A. * * *
B.

The Affidavit of Defendants was not timely.

The motion to disqualify the judge came at the
time indicated just hereinabove, and should have been
summarily denied for that reason. Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale 121 U. 359, 242 P. 2d 297.
C.

Defendants cannot be prejudiced because of
the availability of complete direct review of
both the facts and the law.

In an equity case the Supreme Court will review
questions of both law and fact. Tripp vs. Bagley 7-± Utah
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57, 276 P. 912, 69 ALR 1417. Whether the Trial Court
was biased (which we submit was certainly not the case)
or not becomes immaterial upon this appeal. The Trial
Court took no evidence but only reviewed the record as
it appeared from the pleadings, interrogatories, deposistion and exhibits. If it erred (whether as a result
of bias, prejudice, misapplication of the facts or misinterpretation of the law) all this Honorable Court need
do is reverse the decision.

POINT III.
THE INTERROGATORIES AND THEIR ANSWERS,
THE DEPOSITIONS, AND THE ENTIRE FILE AND
PLEADINGS ARE SUFFICIENT UPON WHICH TO
BASE THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The Appellants' brief argues in three sub-headings
under Point IV that the records and files made are not
sufficient upon which to base a summary judgment notwithstanding that the first motion for summary judgment
was filed by them.
Issue must be taken with their beginning statement
that "even a casual reading of the depositions of the three
witnesses do not show any positiveness upon the part of
any one of them concerning how the water was administered from 1931 to 1961."
Charles Anderson, the deponent in the affidavit of
bias and prejudice and in the third deposition, said when
asked if the distribution practices changed when the
Burton Decree was adopted:
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A.

No, they didn't. The company kind of went
on a share and share alike basis, as Brother
1ohnson, Marcellus, told you, for a while.

Q.

Hmv long did that last'?

A.

Oh, it lasted up until the time the Glendale
Irrigation Company asked the State EnginPer
to grant them whatever rights they havt.

Q.

And that \rnuld have been in 19GO or 1%1,
is that right?
·whenever that was.

A.

(Tr. 118, lines 7-lG)
All the witnesses they planned to call at the trial
(Tr. 51) having knowledge of distribution practices
agreed with the J olmson and Anderson statements.
The State Engineer does not have any record of
water distributions or measurements except for the years
19Gl and 196:2. (Tr. 57, para. 2)
Now here in the pleadings, the record, or the Appellants' brief do we find anyone daring to say that Glendale
has exercised their claimed priority.
The pleadings, admissions and depositions (\\·here
appropriate) must all be considered by the court in
making its determination upon a motion for smmuar.r
judgment. L1111ducrg i:. Backntw1 9 U. 2d 58, 337 P. ~d
433.
The transcendent feature of the record, however, are
the Interrogatories.
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When Glendale Irrigation Company was asked in the
(nterrogatories (Tr. 55) if it used its claimed priority,
an cl if so, how they planned to prove it, they answered:
'l'his interrogatory is not subject to any precise answer, and particularly at this time.
(Tr. 58)
All the supplemental interrogatories (Tr. 54:, 55)
sought to reach the facts about \\rhich Defendant Glendale Irrigation Company had been so highly evasive
in its prior response. (Tr. 50, 51) The answers to the
8upplemental interrogatories were in the form of negative proof (Tr. 57). They have no evidence other than
their own witnesses' sworn testimony that they have not
used this priority at any time within the past 35 years.
'l'he Interrogatories are a sharp sword when it comes
to defining what are and what are not the genuine issues
in a suit, cleaving the real from the apparent or the
suspect. In the 1965 Pocket Supplement to Volume 3,
Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, at
page 7G, Section 1236, it is stated with respect to Answers
to Intenogatories and their relation to Summary Judgllll'n

t:

"' * * There are important differences between
affidavits and answers to interrogatories * * *
An affidavit is the weakest form of evidence and
is not ordinarily admissible at trial. Its function
on a motion for summary judgment is to show that
there is available competent testimony which can
be introduced at the trial. The answer to an
interrogatory, however, is admissible at the trial
when offered by the op1Josing party, since it is
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an admission of an adverse party. An important
purpose of the interrogatories rule is to limit the
parties in their later contentions, and it is immaterial that the party has made the admission,
and thus limited themself, without personal knowledge of the facts. Thus all answers to interrogatories should be considered on a motion for summary judgment when they are put forward by
the party who served the interrogatories.
·
The Defendants' belief that, provided they could
secure a reversal for trial upon the issue of uses, evidence would come forth that Glendale had exercised
its priority is the expression of a faith similar to that
defined by Paul in his letter to the Hebrews as
The substance of things hoped for, the evidence of
things not seen. (Hebrews 11 :1)
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIRECTED THE
STATE ENGINEER TO DISREGARD PRIORITY
DATES PURPOR':eEDLY ADOPTED BY THE BURTON-COX DECREES IN DEROGATION OF THE
EQUAL PRIORITY DATES ESTABLISHED BY
THE MC CARTY DECREE.
It is clear that the "Class 1" rights emerging from
the "Cox" Decree are the exact counterparts of the
rights mrnrded by the ''J\foCarty" Decree (Appendix page
x).

All the trial court did was to treat those users
with the classification of "Class 1" as having equal
priority dates (Tr. 162, 163).
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'l'he only thing required of the State Engineer respecting the judgment of the trial court is that those
"Class 1" users pro-rate losses when the flow of Long
Valley Creek falls below the total volume of water necessary to fill all of those rights designated within "Class l."
As we have tried to demonstrate in this brief, this
has been the practice since 1900.
We take exception to the statement found on pages
and ±1 of Appellants' brief purporting to be a quote
from the "Burton" Decree. Appellants cite no reference
to the record for this quotation. None can be found and
no one has ever been charged with actual or constructive
notice of that language being employed by any court at
any time affecting the watt>rs here in question.
~O

There is an annotation in Volume 120 American
Law Reports beginning at page 868 in which the editor
makes the pertinent statement that:
The cases declare that the rule of practical
construction applies to ambiguous judgments, and
that such a construction adopted by the interested
parties, especially if acquiesced in for a long time,
will not be departed from by the court "except
for strong reasons.'' The observation may be
made, however, that the rule has commonly been
laid down in support of that construction which
the court regarded as correct. And elements of
estoppel sometimes have been present. The rule
seems to have peculiar force as applied to judgments entered uy consent.
(Emphasis Added)
This statement and the cases supporting it seem
dispositive of the issue before the Court.
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A question may be ·whether or not the Burton Deem
is ambiguous. First of all, there is great doubt cast upon
what, if anything, it means when it is absent from tlw
files. Second, it contains a provision for classes of
rights Yd1ich classes are characterized solely by priority
period. This classification has been preserved hy tlw
trial court (Tr. 1G3). Third, the documents '-vhich an·
in the file indicate that the Court has approved the
East Fork "Objection" and incorporated it into the
final determination. Fourth, the decree was entered under jurisdiction of the court to proceed acquired by
virtue of the stipulation of the parties, which stipulation
dictated the terms the Defendants claim are nmr absent
from the decree.
CONCLUSION
The only question to be resolved in this appeal is
whether or not the trial court, on concurrent Motions
for Summary Judgment, correctly ruled that Defendant
Glendale Irrigation Company does not o-wn a priority
which, if assertable, would entitle it to the entire flo1r
of Long Valley Cr<:'ek until all its decreed rights are
filled notwithstanding the following conditions which co<:'xist in militancy against such a preference:
J. \Vhere Defendant Glendale Irrigation Company
stipulated in the proceedings from which they claim this
priority emerged that all rights on the system should
be upon a basis of equal priorities.
:2. \Vhere Defendant GlendalP Irrigation Company
knowing, or being obligated to know, that the Plaintim
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\1ere relying upon the written stipulation, allowed the

fin'-year 1wriod for correction of clerical or other omis~ions or mistakes to expire, and then permitted another
:JO years to elapse before asserting the priority.
:3. Wncre there was no historic basis for the award
of a higher priority.

-±. Wlwre the stipulators for the parties before the

court never did, and Glendale Irrigation Company did
not until 35 years after the preference was purportedly
granted, assert any right to exercise it.
3. \Yh<>re, when all the men who were a party to
the stipulation had since passed from control, supervision
or direction of Glendale Irrigation Company did it for
the first time attempt to assert such a preference.

Respectfully submitted,

OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN
By Ken Chamberlain
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UTAH STATE
ENSINEE:RS OFFICE

In the District Court of the Fifth Judicial
District in and for ·washington County, State of Utah
St. George and Washington
Canal Company, a Corporation.

Objection

vs.
Hurricane Canal Company,
a Corporation, et al.,

I

Comes now, Glendale Irrigation Company, a corporation, Order· I
ville Irrigation Company a corporation, Mt. Carmel Irrigation Corn·
pany a corporation; defendants in this case, and objects to the
proposed determination of water rights on the Virgin River System. I
filed herein by the State Engineer, and shows the Court:
i

I

I.
That on pages 5 to 7 inclusive of said determination, defendanti
is determined to have rights to irrigate certain areas of land.
II.
That the acreage given in said determination is not the acreage
that we have been used to irrigating heretofore.
III.
That we have been for years past operation under a decree
issued in 1900 with W. M. McCarty as Judge.
IV.
That the waters under this decree have been used beneficialy,
and satisfactory to all concerned.

v.

That said determination have set different dates of priority,
which we desire shall all be under the same date, as was set forth
in the aforesaid decree a copy of which is attached hereto, and an)
acres irrigated other than is not called for in the McCarty decree.
this acreage should take a date of priority of 1890.

VI.
That a share of water in the McCarty decree should and was
made to mean the equivalent to an acre of lane!.
Source: Exhibit 5 - File marked "1924" at page 133 - Burton De·
cree proceedings Case No. 270, Washington County
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and that each company or individual be given an acre of land for
each share stated in the aforesaid Decree.
VII.
Wherefore defendant prays that said determination be changed
and that defendants be decreed the right to irrigate and acre of
land for each share of stock given in the McCarty Decree with a
date of 1870. And any acreage which is not covered by McCarty
Decree be given a date of 1890. That the distribution of water
among the different irrigation companes above mentioned be divided
according to the McCarty Decree.
State of Utah
County of .............................. .

SS

being first duly sworn deposes and says that they are the defendants
mentioned in the foregoing objection, that they have read said objection and know the contents thereof to be true of their own knowledge, and therefore says the contents thereof are true.
/S/ Annie Macdonald
Signed
/S/ Fred G. Carroll
Orderville /S/ David Esplin
MtCarmel /S/ W. L. Hodges
Glendale /S/ Marcellus Johnoson
/S/ Whitney Macdonald
/S/ J. C. Spencer
/S/ Fred R. Major
By Howard B. Spencer
By W. Macdonald
/S/ Llyle Chamberlain
/S/ W. S. Carpenter
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15 day of December 1924.
My commission expires
Mar 12, 1926
/s/ J. S. Levanger
Notary Public
On Page 137 of File marked 1919-1935 an exact counterpart of the
foregoing "Objection" is entered showing the signatures of W. L.
Hodges, President of the Board, and D. W. P. Stevens, a member
of the Board, Mt. Carmel Irrigation Company.
Source: Exhibit 5 - file marked "1924" at page 134 cree proceedings.
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Burton De-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH
JUDICIAL DIS'l'RICT IN AND FOR 'L'HE
COUNTY OF KANE, STATI<~ OF U'l'AH
Mt. Carmel Irrig~tion Company, a co~po~ation, Orderville Irrigation Com.
pany, a Corporation and Glendale Irrigation Company, a corporation
Plaintiff's, '

vs.

Joseph Hopkins, John Hyat, James Carpenter, James Smith, John Brim.
hall, TJ:iomas Chamberlain, Willis Webb, John H. Stout, Leroy Harris, John
T. Covmgton. H. 0. Spencer, H. K. Roundy, G. D. McDonald, John W
Seaman, Q. F. Spencer, George Johnson and R. G. Jolley.
Defendants.
DECREE.
This cause came on regularly for trial before the court, a jury trial having
been expressly waived; E. E. Hoffman and John F. Brown appearing as
attorneys for the plaintiffs and John F. Chidester appearing as attorney for
the defendant Thomas Chamberlain and each of the plaintiffs as well as
the following named defendants, to-wit: Joseph Hopkins, H. 0. SpenC€r,
G. D. MacDonald, John W. Seaman, George Johnson, R. G. Jolley, Willis
Webb, J. D. Carpenter, John Hyatt, John H. Stout, Thomas Chamberlain,
James Smith, and 0. F. Spencer having heretofore signed and filed with
the records and files herein stipulations in writing, admitting the rights
and facts of the various parties to be as hereinafter set forth; and default
having been taken against H. K. Roundy, John Brimhall, John T. Coving·
ton and Leroy Harris, they having been regularly served in person with
process and having failed to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint
herein, and the legal time for answering having expired, and witnesses
having been sworn who testified in open court as to the rights the various
parties hereto, and the court being fully advised in the premises and _in
accordance with the said stipulations and testimony made and filed 1~
Findings of fact and conclusions of law,
IT IS TBEREFOR ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1st. That the defc·ndant Thomas Chamberlain, is the owner by prior appropriation, and by open, peaceable uninturrupted and adverse use of all of
the waters of Chamberlains Lake.
2nd. That the Defendants James Carpenter, John Hyat, and James Smith,
ar~ the owners, by prior appropriation, and by open, peaceable, uninter·
rupted and adverse use of all of the waters of Lydia's Fork, a tributary ol
th2 East Fork of the Rio Virgin River, which if not diverted would flow
into the said East Fork of the Rio Virgin River.
3rd. That the plaintiffs and the following named defendants, to-wGit:
Joseph Hopkins, Thomas Chamberlain, Willis Webb, H. 0. Spencer, R. ·
Jolley, R. K. Roundy, G. D. McDonald, John W. Seaman and George
Johnson are the owners and entitlecl to the use of all of the normal flo1;
of the East Fork of the Rio Virgin River, in Kane County, Utah, and 0
its tributaries in the said county (except the aforesaid Chamberla~~ Laalike
and the aforesaid Lydias Fork) in the following proportions, div1dmg ..
of the water of said Lydias Fork) into 1,201-1/3 shares. Then the partie>
in this paragraph mentioned are entitled to and are the owners of the
following proportions, to-wit:
Mt. Carmel Irrigation Company 404 & 5/6 shares of said 1201-1/3 shares
Glendale Irrigation Company, 434 shares of said 1201-1/3 shares
Ord:-rville Irrigation Company, 2651/z shares of said 1201-1/3 shares
Joseph Hopkins 32 shares of said 1201-1/3 shares;
Source: Exhibit 5, page 135 (Also Tr. 6)
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Secom\ Page of Decree.
Thomas Chamberlain. in addition to the waters of the Chamberlain Lake of
which he is the owner as hereinbefore mentioned, is the owner of 11 shares
of said 1201-1/3 shares:
Willis Webb, 10 shares of said 1201-1/3;
H. O. Spencer, 5 shares of said 1201-1/3 shares;
H. K. Roundy, 9 shares of said 1201-1/3 shares;
G. D. McDonald, 9 shares of said 1201-1/3 shares;
.lohn W. Seaman, 9 shares of said 1201-1/3 shares;
George Johnson, 4 shares of the said 1201-1/3 shares;
R. G. Jolley, 7 shares of the 1201-1/3 shares;

That each of the parties to this suit, their agents, servants and employees
be and they and each of them, their agents, servants and employees are
hereby perpetually enjoined and restrained from in any way mnaner or
at all, interfearing with the use of the water which is hereby decreed to
belong to th;;-other parties to this suit, or to either or any of them and
are likewise restrained from in any manner or at all, interfearing with the
full free and uninterrupted enjoyment and use of said wat;'rs as hereinbefore decreed.
4th. That said water (except the waters of Chamberlain Lake and Lydias
Fork) shall be divided and distributed to the parties entitled thereto, by
a water commissioner, to be appointed by the court; that the parties
herdo, who are the owners of a portion of the water which he shall divide,
shall pay said water commissioner a reasonable compensation for his services.
That the prorata of said water commissioner's compensation against each
person after the same becomes due, shall have the effect of a judgment
against each person.

5th. That each party hereto pay his own costs except the costs of court
which shall be apportioned bewteen the several parties hereto according
to the proportion of water herein decreed to them, that the costs of the
clerk of the court are hereby taxed at $10.50.
Dated April 18th, 1900.

W. M. McCarty
Judge
Source: Exhibit 5, page 136 (Also Tr. 7)
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